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ARTICLE
UTILIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO MOVE
THE JEFFERSONS ON UP TO THE EAST
SIDE—EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
SUPPORT DOMESTIC SOCIAL MOBILITY
ITAI APTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars and policy makers usually consider social mobility as an ex-
clusively domestic matter and study and explore it as such. Recognizing the
relevancy of this approach as each society has its own unique social, eco-
nomic, and political circumstances, this paper suggests exploring interna-
tional law to support domestic social mobility, a thus far understudied and
underutilized approach.
This paper begins by proposing a common definition of social mobility
that can be globally understood. As the paper offers a platform intended to
facilitate further studies, the definition chosen is of a general nature, i.e.,
social mobility as an advance in economic or social stature of an individual
in society, including in the intergenerational sense. This approach presents
the recurring view throughout the paper that social mobility should be read
broadly rather than in the narrower traditional sense.
Based on this definitional setting, this paper’s second section examines
social mobility, emphasizing that insufficient social mobility transcends
borders impacting all nations in a world of growing domestic inequality.
This section argues that there could be a cosmopolitan value in the form of
the need to address insufficient social mobility, deriving from global justice
concepts. These concepts cover corrective, restorative, and distributive jus-
* Itai Apter, LL.B. (University of Haifa, 2006); LL.M. International Legal Studies (NYU,
2008); Ph.D. Candidate (University of Haifa, degree expected 2021). An earlier version of this
paper was presented at the University of St. Thomas Law Journal’s March 2020 symposium on
Sovereignty in a Fragmenting, Globalizing World. The author benefited greatly from comments
by symposium participants and the invaluable instructive suggestions by Hila Echerman and Dana
Daybog.
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tice, even absent consensus on the need for equal societies. The argument is
based on acceptance of the definition, offered by scholars such as David
Held, of cosmopolitan values as pertaining to the “moral realm of all
humanity.”1
Next, the third section addresses international economic law, reflected
in bilateral and multilateral cross-border trade frameworks, which is a con-
duit to social mobility. Free trade agreements and global trade arrangements
can suppress social mobility and increase inequality, but this does not have
to be the case. In some circumstances, states can use these platforms to
incentivize social mobility and equality in trade counterparts, including
through economic incentives and bilateral cooperation.
This paper’s fourth section discusses international human rights law
(IHRL), which includes the right to equality. Traditionally, IHRL applies
between a sovereign and its subjects, but this does not preclude the possibil-
ity for international non-state (intergovernmental) actors to use IHRL to
encourage domestic social mobility and monitor relevant progress. This can
be done through the use of reputational tools or by facilitating commitments
on improving social mobility rates in a fixed period. The upcoming decade
presents an opportune moment to follow this course, as social mobility cor-
responds with the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.
This paper’s final section identifies challenges for scholars and policy
makers due to the shift from domestic to global realms to address insuffi-
cient social mobility. Drawing upon successes and failures of turning to
international law to resolve other domestic social issues and law and society
theories, this section offers ideas to mitigate identified challenges to maxi-
mize the potential of the suggested international law approaches.
Social mobility attracted much scholarly and policy attention in past
decades. The impact of the economic crisis associated with the COVID-19
global pandemic is likely to increase the need for facilitating social mobility
domestically and globally.2 Domestic measures, resulting from significant
study, have led to some improvement. At the same time, there is great po-
tential in exploring the unchartered international law waters for ensuring
that every “Jefferson,” wherever in the world he or she may be, will move
on up to the east side at some point or in some generation to come.
1. David Held, Principals of Cosmopolitanism Order, 39 ANALES DE LA CÁTEDRA FRAN-
CISCO SUÁREZ, 153, 154–55 (2005) (elaborating that cosmopolitan values can include: “1. equal
worth and dignity; 2. active agency; 3. personal responsibility and accountability; 4. consent; 5.
collective decision-making about public matters through voting procedures; 6. inclusiveness and
subsidiarity; 7. avoidance of serious harm; and 8. sustainability.”).
2. Lee Elliot Major & Stephen Machin, COVID 19 AND SOCIAL MOBILITY, CENTER FOR
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (LSE) (May 2020), https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cepcovid-19-
004.pdf.
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II. DEFINING SOCIAL MOBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
REGULATION
The first step in any discussion of utilizing social mobility to enhance
equality is to define the term social mobility. Such a definition is important
if the aim is to achieve an efficient deliberative process to facilitate finding
resolutions for promoting social equity. The definition should be based on
scholarship addressing contemporary social mobility in order to understand
how it is perceived. For the purposes of our discussion, we should also bear
in mind the international setting of the discussion suggested and the tools to
be later proposed.
An international normative setting does not always necessitate apply-
ing a different definitional approach. There could be instances where inter-
national definitions aim to reflect domestic notions and understandings.3
However, international law does offer room for some constructive ambigu-
ity,4 reflecting the need to achieve consensus amongst various actors from
different social settings and distinct legal systems.
The question to be asked is what is meant when using the term “social
mobility.” Textbook traditional definitions consider social mobility an in-
tergenerational economic progress, when individuals, over specific periods
of time, improve their economic situation, in the context of a specific do-
mestic society.5
Scholarship and the use of the term social mobility in policy discourse
identify several types of social mobility phenomena. “Absolute social mo-
bility” reflects overall changes of equality in a specific society, i.e., changes
in absolute numerical gaps between high-income and low-income figures.6
“Relative social mobility” describes specific changes in the income levels
of individuals in society in a given societal class, rather than movement
between social and economic levels in society.7 Absolute and relative social
mobility are sometimes correlated—positively when relative and absolute
mobility levels rise together. They can also correlate negatively when levels
are opposite each other in cases where individuals change their place in
society, but gaps remain and there is no true progress towards equality.8
3. RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 353 (1985).
4. For an example in relation to peace agreements, see Christine Bell, Peace Agreements:
Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 373, 398 (2006).
5. For an example of the classical definition of “social mobility,” see Charles F. Westoff et
al., The Concept of Social Mobility: An Empirical Inquiry, 25 AM. SOCIO. REV. 375, 376 (1960).
6. For a discussion between the different outcomes in assessing mobility utilizing both con-
cepts, see FLORIAN R. HERTEL, SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY: CLASS MOBILITY AND
OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 40–41 (2015).
7. Id.
8. This can occur in cases where social inequalities are so much inherent to a specific soci-
ety that they limit the likelihood for intergenerational mobility. See Florian R. Hertela & Olaf
Groh-Samberg, The Relation Between Inequality and Intergenerational Class Mobility in 39
Countries, 84(6) AM. SOCIO. REV. 1099, 1125 (2019).
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The two directions can diversify into various elements, versions, and
approaches, and there is abundant academic debate about their classifica-
tion.9 These directions are interesting; and pinpointing detailed specifics on
social mobility can be relevant for the international norm discussion. Never-
theless, more interesting are the recent calls towards a more holistic and
systematic concept of social mobility. Advocates of this approach see social
mobility as something much more than increase in income or educational
numeric levels and considers social mobility to include access to higher
education, environmental resources, information technology infrastructure,
etc. Under this concept, social mobility should refer to multiple verifiable
social progress indicators.10 This in comparison to the limited approach
which focuses on multigenerational changes in socioeconomic status as a
sole, or key, indicator for social mobility.11
Today in many cases, designing international norms, whether in bilat-
eral or multilateral arenas, can be characterized as a meeting of the minds
between diplomats and experts.12 This is especially the case when the issues
at the core of the norm, which stakeholders are considering are not of a
purely political or realist nature but rather of concepts of a technical nature
but at the same time viewed by states as politically and socially important.13
In such cases, negotiations can be conducted by disaggregated state actors,
ranging from government officials from various governmental departments,
and not necessarily from foreign ministries (or “White House” type offices)
to academics and representatives of the private sector or civil society.14
Comparing the two approaches described earlier, the approach that
considers social mobility as a more flexible concept seems more appropri-
ate for the international setting. Admittedly, opting for a more flexible ap-
proach might result in an imprecise definition of social mobility that may be
9. For an overview of approaches on multigenerational mobility, see Fabian T. Pfeffer, Mul-
tigenerational Approaches to Social Mobility. A Multifaceted Research Agenda, 35 RSCH. SOC.
STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY, 1–12, Mar. 1, 2014. For discourse on indicators for correlation
between absolute and relative social mobility, see Richard Breen, A Framework for Comparative
Analysis of Social Mobility, 19(1) SOCIOLOGY 93 (1985); Raj Chetty et al., Nathaniel Hendren,
Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez, Where is the Land of Opportunity: The Geography of In-
tergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129(4) Q.J. ECON. 1553 (2014); Martin Nybom,
Int’l Lab. Org. [ILO], Intergenerational Mobility: A Dream Deferred?, ILO FUTURE OF WORK
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 7 (2018); Franz Bushca & Patrick Sturgis, Declining Social Mobility?
Evidence from Five Linked Censuses in England and Wales 1971–2011, 69(2) BRIT. J. SOC. 154
(2018).
10. Pfeffer, supra note 9, at 1–12.
11. Id. at 4.
12. For an illustration of this process in respect of the review mechanism of implementation
of the 2005 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, see Matti Joutsen & Adam Graycar,
When Experts and Diplomats Agree: Negotiating Peer Review of the UN Convention Against
Corruption, 18(4) GLOB. GOVERNANCE 425 (2012).
13. Id.
14. ANTHEA ROBERTS ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2018).
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understood differently among different individuals or cultures, thereby cre-
ating regulation issues for the party states.
At the same time, at least in the international setting, it would not be
unusual to “settle” for this type of ambiguity in design of international
norms.15 This might be a worthwhile price to pay for elevating the concept
of social mobility from the domestic realm to the international one. Moreo-
ver, international settings, particularly those of a bilateral trade and eco-
nomic related nature, often include binding dispute resolution
mechanisms.16 These mechanisms tend to refer to disputes in interpretation
of norms and concepts that norm makers include in the agreed regulatory
frameworks.17 Accordingly, any disputes concerning the interpretation and
application of social mobility can be addressed through alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). ADR usually includes a preliminary phase of time-lim-
ited diplomatic consultations followed by arbitration in case the dispute is
not resolved.18
For the purposes of this paper, we can define social mobility as the
increase in opportunities afforded to individuals in society who lacked ac-
cess to them in the past.19 While such opportunities would not necessarily
be reflected in numeric values, indicators include access to financial re-
sources for housing and health care, as well as various other elements relat-
ing to daily life. At the end of the day, the implementation of the concept of
social mobility on international or cross-border realms is dependent on what
indicators and procedural elements would be used to measure it.20
III. SOCIAL MOBILITY AS A COSMOPOLITAN GLOBAL JUSTICE BASED
VALUE
Based on the above definition of social mobility, the next step is ask-
ing on what basis international norms should consider the conceptual
framework suggested and, more importantly, why such norms should ad-
dress social mobility at all. Noting the existence of various other ideas and
concepts that can be associated with a social need, and that these are not
enshrined in any transnational norms, the question becomes what is the
15. Bell, supra note 4.
16. This has been a feature of such arrangements since the early days of international trade
law.  For an extensive analysis, see Christopher Vajda, The EU and Beyond: Dispute Resolution in
International Economic Agreements, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 205, 205–24 (2018).
17. James R. Holbein & Gary Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 CASE W. RSCH. J. INT’L L. 531 (1993).
18. See, e.g., The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
Nov. 30, 2018.
19. For the use of this definition in respect of China, see Li Chunling, Migrant Workers and
Social Mobility, in CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION 217, 240 (2012).
20. In the international norm context, the role of indicators is gaining increasing traction for
the decision-making process by international institutions. See Rene Uruena, Indicators and the
Law: The Rule of Law Index, in THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE,
CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF LAW 75, 92 (Sally Engle Merry et al. eds., 2015).
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unique nature, if any, of social mobility. Until now, there has been little
global regulation of social mobility, perhaps indicating that this topic is not
susceptible to such global ordering.
This paper suggests two main avenues of exploring the feasibility of
justifying the creation of a transnational mechanism to facilitate increased
social mobility: (1) the cosmopolitan value approach21 and (2) the global
justice approach.22 The aim is to offer a combined theoretical justification
that supports social mobility as a cross-border value worthy of regulation
and support. This justification could then serve as an adequate response to
those who might cast doubt on the viability of social mobility as an interna-
tional concept amenable to international legal framework support rather
than a concept limited only to the domestic realm.
A. Social Mobility as a Cosmopolitan Value
In the past, international law was premised purely on the realism
“every state fends for itself.” Under “the foreign office model,” interna-
tional law prefers a “state centered mode” of international law and regula-
tion.23 Under this modality, the values and interests of states are at the core
of the development of international relations, and international law can be
seen as conflicting with global ideals.24 While the international community
recognized individual human rights, these were generally subjected to state
interests. The overarching goal of international law was to preserve the in-
terests of states of survival in the global political system and pursuit of a
relative advantage.25
Today, while for some security related matters this “foreign office”
realism-based modality remains the prevailing theory,26 or as one commen-
21. Such cosmopolitan values could be relevant not only in the context of creating interna-
tional law but could also have significance regarding the implementation of international law.
Mark D. Walters, The Common Law Constitution and Legal Cosmopolitanism, in THE UNITY OF
PUBLIC LAW 431, 452 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004).
22. For a discussion on the potential linkages between international law and global justice,
see Laura Valentini & Tiziana Torresi, Introduction—International Law and Global Justice: A
Happy Marriage, 37(5) REV. INT’L STUD. 2035 (2011).
23. Itai Apter, Yes, Global Minister: Towards Modernization of EU-Global Public Adminis-
tration, 2016 ROCZNIK ADMINISTRACJI PUBLICZNEJ 209, 215 (2016).
24. One way to elevate this conflict is to pursue state-centered liberal theories supporting
moral regulation of powers. Leif Wenar, States, Individuals and Equality, in BETWEEN COSMOPOL-
ITAN IDEALS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: STUDIES IN GLOBAL JUSTICE 25, 34 (Ronald Tinnevelt &
Gert Verschraegen eds., 2006).
25. This is the reason that the foreign office model, at least in the past, was closely associated
with the regulation of the use of force in the international arena. For a discussion of various
developments in this respect in the past few decades, see Benedict Kingsbury, Unit 7: The Use of
Force, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW (International Law Course User’s Guide), https://www.iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/
Unit-7-Reading-Guide.pdf (last updated May 2, 2008).
26. Benedict Kingsbury & Anna Cavnar, Overview: Military, Markets, Morals, INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, https://iilj.org/
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tator puts it “realism may not in fact be quite dead yet,”27 the state of affairs
has somewhat shifted for others. This is particularly relevant for interna-
tional legal regimes based on human rights concepts, most prominently in-
ternational human rights law (IHRL).28
The competing mode to the “foreign office” model is the global gov-
ernance approach.29 Under this modality, states are no longer primarily
fending for themselves but are considered an integral part of the interna-
tional global system.30 Consequently, states can be said to be acting not
solely in accordance with national and domestic values but also in corre-
spondence with transnational values, which we can define as prominently
cosmopolitan or at best, regional.31
Contemplating morals from an international law perspective can be as-
sociated with the aim of achieving justice.32 In an international system
based on political cosmopolitanism, the role of state actors are diminished
in order to emphasize an international legal order.33 However, some argue
that states’ only obligation should be to provide justice to their own citi-
zens.34 At the same time, even that obligation can stem from global norms,
as exemplified by IHRL.35 If international norms are a manifestation of the
idea that justice is universal,36 then global governance where state actors
wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Cavnar-Military-Markets-Morals-2008.pdf (last modified Jan. 14,
2008).
27. FRANK J. GARCIA, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THREE TAKES
5 (2013).
28. For a discussion of the relationship between sovereignty, global governance, and IHRL,
see Daniel Albahary, International Human Rights and Global Governance: The End of National
Sovereignty and the Emergence of a Suzerain World Polity?, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 511 (2010).
29. One practical outcome is that the state (or diplomats) no longer has exclusive rein on
global agenda setting, and society (or the traditional or social media) is increasingly becoming an
equal actor in that regard. WILLIAM MALEY, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND DIPLOMACY: WORLDS
APART? 20 (2008).
30. This system now can be considered to include, inter alia, such actors as civil society,
businesses, and municipal governments. CHADWICK F. ALGER, THE UN SYSTEM AND CITIES IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 133 (2014).
31. In some cases, only state actors can institutionalize cosmopolitan values, making their
role imperative in the context of global governance. See ANNA HALAFOFF, THE MULTIFAITH
MOVEMENT: GLOBAL RISKS AND COSMOPOLITAN SOLUTIONS 21 (2013).
32. Kingsbury & Cavnar, supra note 26, at 1.
33. Id. at 3. For the linkages between political cosmopolitanism, global governance, and prin-
ciples of justice, see Garrett W. Brown & David Held, Editors’ Introduction to THE COSMOPOLI-
TAN READER (Garrett W. Brown & David Held eds., 2010).
34. Kingsbury & Cavnar, supra note 26, at 4. Some perceive that “universalism” of justice
poses a danger that state actors will pursue this notion in order to avoid acting upon the obliga-
tions towards their nationals. See, e.g., H. PATRICK GLENN, THE COSMOPOLITAN STATE 174
(2013).
35. The IHRL regime has transformed states’ domestic human rights obligations beyond
merely “matters internal to the state,” to obligations on the international realm. TODD LANDMAN &
EDZIA CARVALHO, MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (2010).
36. HEATHER M. ROFF, GLOBAL JUSTICE, KANT AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A
PROVISIONAL DUTY 1 (2013).
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still play a significant role might be an important factor in achieving justice
beyond the purely domestic context.
The concept of social mobility can be placed within the global govern-
ance morals framework. Equality in society, global or domestic, can be a
highly controversial goal to strive for.37 This is because of differing views
about whether there is a need to ensure equality between states or between
individuals.38
Conversely, “flexible” social mobility might be less controversial and
problematic. Presumably, all actors in the international community share
the wish that individuals improve their situation from generation to genera-
tion and that the overall situation, circumstances or prosperity in a specific
society will be better.39 Admittedly, some regimes might prefer that societal
gaps remain and that class structures be preserved. Because such a prefer-
ence would not be publicly declared, that regime’s global effectiveness in
resistance to promotion of social mobility as a global cosmopolitan norma-
tive value is limited.
It is likely that while the dichotomy between Western and Eastern val-
ues can sometimes characterize debates on international law and values
with respect to socialism and capitalism,40 there could be little disagreement
that states should make their citizens’ lives better and “move” them from
poverty to prosperity. Even if some states do not explicitly develop policies
towards achieving this goal,41 we can at least consider social mobility as a
goal that all states can be assumed to support, even if only from a declara-
tory perspective.
From a perspective of cosmopolitan value-based development of inter-
national norms, the declaratory element may serve as motivation for future
adherence to norms which support social mobility. Such adherence has
value potential in itself, even if it is not based or followed by development
37. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is that equality between states in contemporary
times is unrealistic. See BART LANDHEER, ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN-
TERNATIONAL SOCIETY 28 (1966).
38. It is important to note that while equality between states is considered a mainstay of
international law, it usually refers to the independence of one state from others, rather than to
equality on economic terms. See Ulrich K. Preuss, Equality of States—Its Meaning in a Constitu-
tionalized Global Order, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 17, 42 (2008).
39. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that “end poverty” was defined as the first
2030 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) promulgated by the UN General Assembly in 2015.
G.A. Res. 70/01, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, at 14,
15 (Sept. 25, 2015). The tenth SDG also aspires to achieve income growth for low-income earners
to reduce inequality. Id. at 21. For the linkage between reduced poverty and social mobility, see
PWC, SDG 10: REDUCED INEQUALITIES: REDUCE INEQUALITY WITHIN AND AMONG COUNTRIES
(2016), https://dm.pwc.com/SDGSelector/Resources/10.pdf.
40. For an example of an analysis of these tensions, see B.S. Chimni, Capitalism, Imperial-
ism, and International Law in the Twenty-First Century, 14 OR. R. INT’L L. 17 (2012).
41. This outcome is related, in some instances, to domestic, economic, and social restraints.
See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER,
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 446 (2012).
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of comprehensive domestic policy on social mobility. The United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, with over 185 member states,42 demon-
strated the advantages in creating vehicles for states to attain reputational
benefits. At the very least, a cosmopolitan value of social mobility fleshed
out in cross-border normative regulation, to which states commit to in a
legally binding contract (or similar), could elevate social mobility in global
policy maker agendas and make it more difficult for states to openly oppose
it or neglect it. Moreover, branding social mobility as a value with cosmo-
politan features would facilitate linking it with global initiatives, for exam-
ple the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals,43 which can highly contribute
to its prominence on the global stage.
B. Social Mobility and Global Justice
Alternatively, we can consider social mobility in global justice theory
implementation frameworks. If we can define social mobility as manifest-
ing global justice theories, this can provide an additional important justifi-
cation for pursuing its regulation on the cross-border level.
Global justice encompasses a more utopian drive for a wide variety of
concepts that ranges from calls for inclusive human rights to all to global
economic equality and eradication of world poverty and starvation.44
Global justice advocates use the term in multiple senses. For example,
every individual is entitled to the same rights and should be treated the
same,45 although there could be questions as to the content of those rights
and who should determine it.46 Alternatively, there is a minimum standard
of rights that states can supplement if they wish to do so.47 Finally, only
nation states operating internally can achieve global justice ideals, as absent
42. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND
CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/uncac.html (last visited June 13, 2020).
43. For an example of such linkage to various SDG goals, see Sustainable Development
Outlook 2019: Gathering Storms and Silver Linings, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECO-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (2019), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/up
loads/sites/45/publication/SDO2019_Preview_Booklet_Web.pdf.
44. For an example of the linkage between global justice and poverty eradication, democrati-
zation, and modernization, see HUW L. WILLIAMS & CARL DEATH, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE BASICS
125 (2016).
45. Erin K. Wilson, Beyond Dualism: Expanded Understandings of Religion and Global Jus-
tice, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MODERN THEORY, MODERN POWER, WORLD
POLITICS—CRITICAL INVESTIGATIONS 313, 320 (Nevzat Soguk & Scott G. Nelson eds., 2016).
46. One traditional idea is that the content of principles of justice (or rights) should be deter-
mined by an integrated “reflective equilibrium” of substantive arguments based on the “national”
principles of justice, which can potentially apply globally. See MATHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUS-
TICE 39–40 (2012).
47. This concept is termed by some “global sufficientarinism,” which places on states the
discretion on how to complement it domestically and globally. For an analysis and critique of this
approach, see Nils Holtug, The Cosmopolitan Strikes Back: A Critical Discussion of Miller on
Nationality and Global Equality, 4 ETHICS & GLOB. POL. 147, 158–61 (2011).
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a global sovereign, identical cross-border rights “do not merit the full name
of justice.”48
Today there are diverging views of what global justice should focus
on; should the focus be individuals in themselves, or should efforts be fo-
cused on finding equality between nation states?49 Alongside these more
traditional approaches, there are also attempts at finding a middle ground or
a different approach such as Risse’s idea of a “common ownership of the
earth” where states and individuals have rights and obligations in facilitat-
ing global justice.50
Advocates of global justice, such as Rawls, view it is an important
measure to ensure the well-being of individuals, based on a duty of cooper-
ation between states (albeit not unlimited).51
Recognizing this notion as a common base line for global justice, fur-
ther elaboration is controversial. Rawls was reluctant to view such a duty as
linked to the promotion of liberal values.52 Nevertheless, there are those
who see it as a framework to facilitate development of specific norms like
democratic values to enhance legitimacy based on principles of shared com-
mon global responsibility inspired by cosmopolitan values.53 This kind of
approach might be one to strive for, but it attracts criticisms from those who
view it as an unattainable utopian goal in a “realist” world of struggle for
power between states, individuals, and international actors.54
This view of global justice in the framework of an eternal and inherent
power struggle between competing values and interests of states and other
stakeholders in international norm-making necessitates consensus on the vi-
ability of social mobility as an overriding value that is worthy of global
attention.
48. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 113, 121–22
(2005).
49. These concepts can be linked as a possible argument, which some claim to be “too opti-
mistic,” that equality between states will necessarily be followed by equality between individuals.
KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND PATRIOT-
ISM 36 (2004).
50. RISSE, supra note 46, at 11.
51. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: WITH, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED
84–85 (1999) (explaining that such a duty is not mandatory and it is up to states to consider how,
and whether, to fulfill it to elevate the burdens of individuals living under less favorable
conditions).
52. Id. at 85.
53. For a discussion of the linkage between cosmopolitan values and global justice in the
political context, see Avia Pasternak, Cosmopolitan Justice and Global Democracies, in GLOBAL
POLITICAL JUSTICE 129, 134 (2014).
54. Even under this “realistic” view, states and individuals still have a moral responsibility
for “global injustice.” Pablo De Greiff & Ciaran Cronin, Introduction: Normative Responses to
Current Challenges of Global Governance, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS:
ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 1, 1–3 (Pablo De Greiff
& Ciaran Cronin eds., 2006).
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Ayelet Shachar’s theory on “birthright lottery” argues that birthright
citizenship is an important element in the question of justice on the global
scale.55 According to Shachar, the idea that a person who is born in one
richer country and not in another poorer country gains the citizenship of the
former perpetuates global inequality.56 Based on this approach, we should
not view social mobility as a matter solely dependent on “luck” or the place
of birth of an individual. Consequently, creating international norms to ele-
vate some of this inequality can be a worthwhile endeavor.
Scholars often think about global justice as an overriding and over-
arching conceptual framework which can be compartmentalized into vari-
ous types of global versions of the different kinds of justice theories
including corrective, restorative, and distributive justice. It could be useful
to understand how these theories can relate to the suggested social mobility
global cosmopolitan value.
1. Corrective Justice
Aristotle offered that the fundamentals of corrective justice were aim-
ing to describe mechanisms pertaining to compensation and remedies for
individuals who suffer harm.57
An important element in the corrective justice concept is equality be-
tween parties to a transaction and the Kantian idea of individual rights.58
Accordingly, when two parties are correlatively situated (due to a contract,
property, or tort law relationship), there is an obligation to recognize Party
A’s autonomy towards Party B. If Party A breached a contractual, property,
or tort based duty, deriving from legal proximity, to Party B, Party A must
make amends and undo the injustice resulting from the breach. Ernest
Weinrib terms this form of compensation based on corrective justice as
“Restitutionary Damages.”59
Seemingly, corrective justice in this pure form is somewhat irrelevant
to social mobility as discussed so far, as it will be difficult to establish
wrongs between state actors directly relevant to oppression of social mobil-
ity. While this might ultimately be the case, corrective justice offers an
55. Shachar is considered a groundbreaking leading global academic on issues pertaining to
immigration, political science, and international relations. For an example of her approach to the
relationship between birthright citizenship and global justice, see AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTH-
RIGHT LOTTERY—CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL EQUALITY 22 (2009).
56. Ayelet Shachar, The Worth of Citizenship in an Unequal World, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIR-
IES L. 367, 369 (2007).
57. JOYCELYN M. POLLOCK, ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 56
(9th ed. 2017).
58. IZHAK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN
TIMES 192 (2009).
59. Ernest J. Weinrib is a recognized leading scholar focusing his work on tort law and the
theory of private law. For his views on restitution and corrective justice, see Ernest J. Weinrib,
Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2000).
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important remedial element to correct past wrongs, whether by monetary
restitution or any other means.60 The international community can adopt
this idea, with some adjustments and alignments, to support the need for
action to remedy gaps and deficiencies in social mobility.61 However, plac-
ing responsibility on the wrongdoer, as it is likely to be the nation state,
may stifle implementing the core principles of corrective justice to the
global social mobility value.62 Instead, the international community as a
whole could be said to be at fault for the lack of domestic social mobility.63
At the same time, such an argument seems quite far-fetched, as unlike in the
context of, for example, environmental issues, it would be challenging to
present a convincing argument in support of collective global responsibility
for lack of social mobility in a domestic setting.
2. Restorative Justice
Restorative justice focuses on measures to repair harm caused by crim-
inal behaviors, aiming to address the needs of all relevant stakeholders, par-
ticularly offenders and victims.64 Although scholars usually think of
restorative justice as mainly related to internal circumstances65 and rehabili-
tation of domestic societies, there are also those who see value in applying
it in the international cross-border level.66
Recognizing the difficulties with linking global restorative justice with
social mobility, there could still be connections between the two conceptual
notions, as some consider restorative justice as one of the factors which
60. For a discussion of possible linkages between corrective justice and remedying past his-
torical wrongs, see Katrina M. Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification for Redressing Historical
Injustices?, 61 VAND. L. REV. 127 (2008).
61. One example is taking measures to promote affirmative action policies and equal oppor-
tunities for social groups that faced disadvantages in the past. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Rethink-
ing Diversity and Proxies for Economic Disadvantage in Higher Education: A First Generation
Students’ Project, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 433, 437–39 (2014).
62. Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10
J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 194 (1981).
63. Such an argument can be seen as part of the overall failures, in some cases, of the inter-
national community to provide the necessary means to achieve declared policy goals. See INST.
FOR STATE EFFECTIVENESS, RECENT EXPERIENCES IN LINKING DIPLOMATIC PEACEMAKING WITH
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 14 (2008), https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/fn/
multidimensional-and-integrated/linking-diplomacy-and-development-draft-jan-24-_4_.pdf.
64. Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Tali Gal, Criminal Law Multitasking, 8 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 893, 920 (2014).
65. Sometimes restorative justice is perceived as mainly relevant to the domestic criminal
system, as can be ascertained from the provisions of the United Nations Basic Principles on the
Use of Restorative Justice Programs in Criminal Matters. Economic and Social Council Res.
2000/14, U.N. Doc. E/2000/INF/2/Add.2, at 35 (2000).
66. This can arguably be the case even if enforcement, which might be critical for the success
of restorative justice, can be inherently ineffective on the international level (and the only result
that can be attained is to strengthen compliance with international criminal law standards). See M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by
Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711, 799 (2008).
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facilitate social mobility.67 This could occur in cases where overall restora-
tive justice approaches are linked to societal transformation. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to claim that one state should be responsible for applying restor-
ative justice reforms in another, which usually includes various domestic
elements linked to domestic criminal justice systems.68 Accordingly, it
seems that like corrective justice, restorative justice in itself is not suffi-
ciently linked to social mobility concepts in order to serve as justification
for the development of international norms to facilitate it.
3. Distributive Justice
The basic formula of distributive justice is the idea that policy makers
should distribute benefits and burdens amongst society in accordance with
justice-based criteria.69 In acting under the moral guidance of this theory,
distribution should arguably be made in accordance with “just” criteria,
whatever these criteria may be.70
Under this framework, Aristotle describes the main difference between
corrective justice and distributive justice to be the applicable standard to
allocation of resources. In the case of corrective justice, the basis is the
harm caused and subsequent punishment (i.e., the need to make amends),
while distributive justice can be based on a subjective criteria of merit as
the basis for distribution.71
Shachar’s criticism of birthright citizenship is informative when ad-
dressing the question of distributive justice on the global scale. Shachar
states that birthright citizenship perpetuates global inequality and infringes
upon distributive justice because a person who is born in one richer country
and not in another poorer country gains the citizenship of the former.72 Fol-
lowing this approach, enhanced social mobility on both domestic and global
scales can serve an important role in remedying at least some of this inher-
ent injustice. As there are no norms mandating global equal distribution of
wealth, it is arguable that international law and distributive justice are not
closely linked.73 According to Rawls, imposing principles of equal distribu-
67. GERRY JOHNSTONE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEAS, VALUES, DEBATES 50 (2002).
68. For various elements that could be included, see the United Nations Basic Principles on
the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters. Economic and Social Council
Res. 2002/12, U.N. Doc. E/RES/2002/12, at 35 (2002).
69. Julian Lamont & Christi Favor, Distributive Justice, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUS-
TICE, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
70. It should be noted that there is controversy about both what should be the relevant criteria
and whether they should indeed be “just.” See COLLEEN MURPHY, THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 105 (2017).
71. SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 19 (2004).
72. Shachar, supra note 56.
73. This means that even if the principles of distributive justice are global, they are not
international or cross-border. See Terry Nardin, International Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 594, 604 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds., 2008).
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tion between states is not only completely unnecessary but could interfere
with sovereign prerogatives of social distribution.74
Some criticize Rawls’s ideas as lacking in understanding of the impli-
cations of global circumstances to the internal functions of a state. In con-
temporary times many states are not self-sufficient but are rather dependent
on others, due to the global basic economic structure (and not solely due to
governance failure).75 The lack of self-sufficiency and basic means can pro-
foundly implicate the ability of states to develop distributive-justice based
policies. While international institutional frameworks have been developed
to remedy global disparities, many of these institutions are inherently con-
trolled by the few economic and political superpowers (disparate political
agents), sometimes exacerbating the lack of global distributive justice rather
than rectifying it.76
Translating theory to practice, advocates of a close linkage between
distributive justice and international law claim that the theory can serve as a
basis for establishing common international governance regimes, address-
ing the lack of an enforcing institutional capacity is not a determinative
factor.77 If global economic disparities violate human rights, a lack of
global distributive justice can be considered a violation of international law,
if not at letter, then at least in spirit.78
One major counterargument to this assertion is made by Buchanan.
According to him, while distributive justice is relevant in the global context,
it is unrealistic to expect global order to be based on an equal merit-based
distribution of goods due to the lack of institutional capacity to enforce such
an order. Ultimately, Buchanan concludes, similarly to Rawls, that states
(and not the international community) are the primary arbiters and agents of
distributive justice.79 Shachar is not deterred by this lack of institutional
mechanism in finding remedies for inequalities deriving from birthright citi-
zenship. She suggests each individual in a “richer” country pay a levy for
their privilege. Due to the impracticality of this idea, she suggests interna-
tional institutional designs to achieve the same result.80
Shachar’s ideas highlight the significant potential which lies in utiliz-
ing distributive justice in its global justice contours has great potential to
74. Id.
75. ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDA-
TIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 209–10 (Will Kymlicka et al. eds., 2004).
76. OISIN SUTTLE, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND WORLD TRADE LAW: A POLITICAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 132 (2018).
77. EDWIN EGEDE & PETER SUTCH, The Law of the Sea: Justice and the Common Heritage of
Mankind, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 306, 336–37
(2013).
78. ARIE M. KACOWICZ, GLOBALIZATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: THE LATIN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1982–2008 41 (2013).
79. BUCHANAN, supra note 75, at 193.
80. SHACHAR, supra note 55, 101–08.
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advance the cause of creating international normative frameworks to sup-
port social mobility. If we agree that the need for economic development
for future generations is inherently linked to distributive justice,81 this com-
bination between the international and national linkages can support the ar-
gument that distributive justice justifies creating an intentional legal
platform to promote it in the form of an international normative framework.
As the analysis in this section demonstrated, there could be various
ways to justify providing prominence for the value of social mobility.
Rather than offering a decisive theoretical justification, the aim of this sec-
tion was to serve as an illustration of how general theoretical approaches
can provide social mobility with a platform to facilitate its implementation
in practice on the transnational normative realm.
IV. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND SOCIAL MOBILITY
International economic law is manifested in three main types of re-
gimes: multilateral agreements with an almost universal character, such as
WTO related agreements or their regional formations,82 bilateral or tripar-
tite agreements of a similar nature mainly pertaining to free trade agree-
ments,83 and soft law standards designed by inter-governmental
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD).84
The framework of universal/regional duty and subsidies related agree-
ments may include social mobility elements. At face value, these agree-
ments are aimed at an opposite end of the domestic state’s efforts to
promote social mobility.85 They often prohibit providing government subsi-
dies or mandate allowing fair terms for foreign competitors to domestic
actors.86 Such agreements can even go so far as to hold that actions by
governments to give advantages to domestic actors (including steps which
81. Gail E. Henderson, Rawls & Sustainable Development, 7 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. AND POL’Y 1, 4 (2011).
82. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; ASEAN Free Trade
Agreements (AFTA), Jan. 28, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 513.
83. One recent example is the United-States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which
went into force on July 1, 2020. See Agreement Between the United States of America, the United
Mexican States, and Canada, Pub. L. No. 116-113, 134 Stat. 11 (July 1, 2020).
84. See, e.g., Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], OECD Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises (May 24, 2011), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/
instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0144.
85. For an example of the lack of support in Germany (associated with such concerns) for
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the EU and the
US, which ultimately failed, see Christian Bluth, A Surplus of Anxiety: TTIP and Germany,
NEWPOLITIK (2016), http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/blut/bluth_newpolitik_german_poli
cy_translated_10_2016-5.pdf.
86. In the context of the WTO, see GURWINDER SINGH, SUBSIDIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
WTO’S FREE TRADE SYSTEM: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 85 (2017).
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can likely contribute to social mobility) can result in exposure to legal pro-
ceedings and sanctions.87 This challenges utilizing these types of agree-
ments to promote social mobility. Allowing states to enact such measures
unilaterally might render the universal or regional framework irrelevant.
At the same time, the problem of undermining the general legal order
which serves as the basis for the universal or regional mechanisms might be
less of a challenge when similar arrangements are made on the bilateral
realm,88 or in cases where free trade agreements are concluded between
limited numbers of actors. Under these circumstances, including exceptions
to the underlying obligations might be more amenable or workable.89 One
relevant scenario is an agreement between states that are parties to a free-
trade agreement (FTA) that they will consider measures specifically in-
tended at promoting social mobility goals as lawful exceptions to, for exam-
ple, prohibitions on measures limiting the rights of foreign investors.90
Noting the ambiguous nature of an internationally defined concept of social
mobility earlier discussed, these types of exceptions have the risk of being
abused. Nevertheless, as the states parties can permit such exceptions on a
reciprocal basis (i.e., both states can apply them),91 this type of concern
might be of a relatively limited scope. Moreover, FTAs usually include dis-
pute resolution mechanisms applicable to inter-state and investor-state dis-
putes. Such mechanisms can also be utilized for resolving disputes on the
applicability of the social mobility exceptions. This is because specific dis-
pute settlement mechanisms could also be created to specifically address
87. For a discussion of the WTO sanctioning mechanism, see Tarcisio Gazzini, The Legal
Nature of WTO Obligations and the Consequences of Their Violation, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 723
(2006).
88. At the same time, if bilateral agreements differ from principles set out by the WTO
framework, they can lead to further fragmentation of the international trade legal order. See Ste-
phan W. Schill, Authority, Legitimacy and Fragmentation in the (Envisaged) Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms in Mega-Regionals, in MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CETA, TTIP, AND
TISA: NEW ORIENTATIONS FOR EU EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 111, 113 (Stefan Griller et
al. eds., 2017).
89. In this sense, creating allowances for states to divert from applicable prohibitions can
also be part of mega multilateral frameworks, as demonstrated in the case of allowances for pru-
dential regulation of the finance sector under the WTO system. For an extensive discussion, see
Andrew D. Mitchell et al., Dear Prudence: Allowances Under International Trade and Investment
Law for Prudential Regulation in the Financial Services Sector, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 787 (2016).
90. The most common exceptions in this respect pertain to national security or public order.
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Provisions in Economic Integration
Agreements, 69, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/10 (2006). However, states can bilaterally agree on ex-
ceptions of a different nature.
91. See, e.g., Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Chile, art. Kbis-16, (Feb. 5, 2019),
36 I.L.M. 1067 (“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from taking any
action . . . which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests relating
to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for
national security or for national defence purposes.”).
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controversies over how these exceptions were applied by the contracting
states.92
In the context of FTAs, states can develop other elements to elevate
social mobility. As in many cases there is disparity between the “nature” of
the states which are parties to the FTAs, these can include incentive mecha-
nisms for the “weaker” states to promote internal social mobility.93 Such
mechanisms can be manifested in actual funds, or more likely, in relaxing
obligations under FTA and wider openings for the investors of one state
party in the other state party or providing them with leverage on domestic
actors. Some might see these types of incentives as controversial, conflict-
ing with domestic interests as well as a breach of the delicate balance con-
tained in an FTA.94 At the same time, if social mobility is a cosmopolitan
value and states parties to an FTA will mutually consider its promotion as a
shared interest conducive to economic stability, both notions can serve as
platform for policy makers to publicly justify including “social mobility
incentives” in FTAs.
Alongside the FTAs, the second available tool for international eco-
nomic law to support social mobility lies in the soft law realm. Recognizing
that FTAs are subject to an agreement between states and could inherently
apply only under certain circumstances, soft law can allow a workable alter-
native to facilitate international cooperation where consensus on legal obli-
gations is not attainable.95
In the case of social mobility, international economic organization can
collect information about how state actors are addressing the issue and
working to promote it in their domestic setting. One such example is the
work done by the OECD on the issue, providing overview and comparisons
92. See, e.g., European Union-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, art. 14.1 (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961 (“The objective of this [dispute settle-
ment] Chapter is to avoid and settle any difference between the Parties concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of this Agreement with a view to arrive at, where possible, a mutually
acceptable solution.”).
93. Disparities between “stronger” and “weaker” parties to a trade agreement can play a
significant role in the design of the agreement, usually to benefit the stronger partner. At the same
time, the weaker partner might perceive the interests of the counterpart as its own, and there could
be convergence (which might also include the concept of social mobility in the weaker state if the
lack thereof negatively impacts the stronger partner). See Michael Sampson, The Evolution of
China’s Regional Trade Agreements: Power Dynamics and the Future of the Asia-Pacific, 34
PAC. REV. 259, 280–81 (2019).
94. At the same time, including such “positive” incentives in trade agreements can serve as
an adequate response to those who view these agreements, in their contemporary form, as a plat-
form to increase global inequality and open to abuse by various actors wishing to increase their
global influence and financial gains. For an example of such a criticism, see Dani Rodrik, What
Do Trade Agreements Really Do?, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 73, 88–89 (2018).
95. Itai Apter, The New International Law Frontier: The Legal Profession and the Chal-
lenges of New “International Law” in the New Member State, 10 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. &
POL’Y 215 (2014); C.M. Hinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development of International Law,
38 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 850, 866 (1989).
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between social mobility levels in its member states.96 The practical value of
such reports can be varied, ranging from the reputational to the legal, de-
pending on their nature and format. Bearing in mind that global reputation
in itself cannot bind a state to act or fail to act, it can play an important role
in the domestic decision-making process. This is more likely when interna-
tional organizations take steps which can significantly impact targeted
states, including counter measures by other states to induce compliance by
the targeted state.97
Sometimes, soft law, reputational based, standards or reports can in-
clude rankings, facilitating reputational strength.98 At first blush, “social
mobility rankings” can be useful for promoting related domestic policies:
they can serve as criteria for distributing foreign aid and investments;99 fol-
low up on improvements is easier, based on comparisons between rankings
from one year to the next, to gauge progress or lack thereof;100 and even if
it might be difficult, or even impossible, to arrive at scientifically accurate
results,101 rankings can serve as important signs for success or failure.
On the other hand, legitimacy of ranking based systems is based on its
methodology. If stakeholders, including states, consider the way rankings
are compiled  to be faulty than it is likely to be inefficient and potentially
counterproductive.102 Therefore, if international intergovernmental organi-
zations would adopt this measure for promoting social mobility, any rank-
ings or assessments of social mobility indicators would necessarily have to
be largely based on information provided by states.103 One alternative to
96. OECD, A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility—Overview and
Main Findings (2018), https://www.oecd.org/social/soc/Social-mobility-2018-Overview-
MainFindings.pdf.
97. In the context of norms against money laundering and financing of terrorism and actions
taken by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), see Isobel Roele, Sidelining Subsidiarity:
United Nations Security Council “Legislation” and Its Infra-Law, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189,
211–14 (2016).
98. The use of rankings (or indicators) is increasingly common in various aspects of soft law
forms of international law, although there are subject matters in which its usage is controversial,
for example in the context of compliance with human rights regimes. See Sally Engle Merry,
Firming Up Soft Law: The Impact of Indicators on Transnational Human Rights Legal Orders, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 375 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).
99. Nikhil K. Dutta, Accountability in the Generation of Governance Indicators, 22 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 401, 409–12 (2010).
100. Craig P. Ehrlich & Dae Seob Kang, Independence and Corruption in Korea, 16 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 12 (2002).
101. Nehal Bhuta, Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the Calcula-
bility of Political Order, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH CLASSIFICA-
TION AND RANKINGS 156 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012).
102. One example of faulty methodology can be the lack of opportunity for all actors con-
cerned to participate in production of the standards or indicators. See ANTONIO SEGURA SERRANO,
Reforming the Trading and Financial System, in THE REFORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE 3, 12–13 (Antonio Segura Serrano ed., 2016).
103. This can be achieved, for example, by information provided by states through self-assess-
ment questionnaires. See The Comprehensive Self-Assessment Checklist on the Implementation of
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such a ranking system, which states might reject,104 could be that any as-
sessments of social mobility level would produce only reports highlighting
best practices and observations compiled during the assessment process.105
Considering contemporary practices, experts representing member states
can carry out the assessment (peer review)  or independent experts can be
appointed to perform this task.106
International economic law and the work of international intergovern-
mental organizations has potential to create hard or soft transnational norms
and standards to promote domestic social mobility. Recognizing that the
interests of the international community would not necessarily correspond
with the aims of domestic social mobility, the alternative normative route
might lie within IHRL, discussed in the next section.
V. DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW NORMS TO
PROMOTE SOCIAL MOBILITY
Compared to international economic law, social mobility, which is
often perceived as an issue closely related to individual rights and wel-
fare,107 seems to be more naturally linked to IHRL. First and foremost, the
path to developing IHRL norms to support development of infrastructure to
promote global social mobility is through the application of the right to
equality (of opportunity) under the relevant instruments.108 The argument
could be that assuming that social mobility includes core elements of the
right to equality in IHRL, then state actors are under a normative obligation
to promote it.109 Considering the viability of this argument, the first chal-
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/self-assessment.html (last visited July 3, 2020).
104. In the UNCAC context, states explicitly rejected a mechanism that would include a rank-
ing system. See Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption—Basic Documents, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, art. 3(b)
(2011), https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/ReviewMechanism-
BasicDocuments/Mechanism_for_the_Review_of_Implementation_-_Basic_Documents_-_E.pdf.
105. Id. at art. 33.
106. For a comprehensive review of compliance monitoring mechanisms for international
treaties, see Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, Third Rep. on Crimes
Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/704, at 100–12 (Jan. 23, 2017).
107. For an approach that disputes the correlativity between upward mobility and social wel-
fare, see Tak Wing Chan, Social Mobility and the Well-Being of Individuals, 69 BRIT. J. SOCIO.
183, 200 (2018).
108. For an extensive discussion on the linkages between social mobility and equalities of
opportunities, see OECD, The Issues Note: The Only Way Is Up? Social Mobility and Equal
Opportunities (May 4, 2017), https://www.oecd.org/inclusive-growth/inequality-and-opportunity/
The-Issues-Note-Social-Mobility-and-Equal-Opportunities-May-4-2017.pdf.
109. One core element in this respect could be the linkage between discrimination and the lack
of capacity of certain social groups to enjoy economic progress and growth. See TAMMIE O’NEIL
& LAURE-HÉLÈNE PIRON, OVERSEAS DEV. INST., RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO TACKLING DIS-
CRIMINATION AND HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY 12 (2003), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/
odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4555.pdf.
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lenge arising is the need for establishing a right to equality under IHRL.110
Noting the various international treaties and instruments, with almost uni-
versal adherence, explicitly referring to the right to equality albeit for spe-
cific circumstances,111 this might not constitute a significant challenge. This
is because on aggregate it could be quite difficult to deny that the interna-
tional community does not recognize a basic right to equality under interna-
tional law.112
The second challenge to consider is whether the implementation of the
right to equality by state actors, including social mobility, is in fact imple-
mented under current IHRL regimes, through IHRL monitoring mecha-
nisms.113 Such mechanisms primarily focus on expert assessments of IHRL
implementation by states, mainly by the various treaty bodies of the Human
Rights Council (HRC).114 At the end of the review processes, the relevant
bodies issue recommendations for states to follow.115  This kind of monitor-
ing process, based on universal standards, also contributes to the implemen-
tation of the right to equality under IHRL.116 If the monitoring process
includes an emphasis on social mobility, this could mandate states to act
and remedy social inequalities.
Attractive as these presumptions might be, in reality the IHRL review
processes are inherently flawed. Not only do some states consider their out-
comes, which can be in the form of HRC resolutions, to not be objective,117
but there also is no true way to ensure that state actors follow up recom-
mendations issued by the treaty bodies.118 Moreover, determinations made
by experts acting in their personal capacity, mostly non-government offi-
110. Daniel Moeckli, Equality and Non-Discrimination, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 189, 193 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2010).
111. See, e.g., International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 14(1),
(Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (referring to the right of equality before the courts); Interna-
tional Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) art. 3  (Dec. 19, 1966) 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (referring to economic, social, and cultural rights).
112. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”).
113. Social mobility can be considered as one of the main social indicators related to living
conditions and social and economic conditions. U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.
[OHCHR], HUMAN RIGHTS INDICATORS: A GUIDE TO MEASUREMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION, at
57, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/12/5, U.N. Sales No. 13.XIV.2 (2012).
114. Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties, OHCHR, https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited July 3, 2020).
115. Id.
116. Alongside the monitoring process, the treaty bodies also issue general comments on the
implementation of the Covenants. In the context of the right to equality, see U.N., Econ. & Soc.
Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, GEN. COMMENT N. 16 on Art. 3 of The Int’l
Covenant on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/3 (2005).
117. For views expressed on the work of the HRC during a discussion in the U.N. General
Assembly, for example, see Meetings Coverage, Delegates Argue over Objectivity, Double Stan-
dards in Human Rights Council, as General Assembly Considers Annual Report, at 2, U.N. Doc.
GA/12087 (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12087.doc.htm.
118. Follow-up procedures for some aspects of the outcomes monitoring process are in place,
but reviews of state actors’ rate of compliance with such outcomes indicate a relatively low com-
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cials, could raise significant legitimacy issues for domestic policy mak-
ers.119 This can be especially problematic for social mobility, a notion
inherently linked to specific and unique circumstances of each domestic
society.120 Consequently, even if monitoring of the right to equality in-
cludes a focus on social mobility, or even if a new right to social mobility is
created, an extremely challenging feat on its own,121 going down this IHRL
venue seems to have little potential for true success.
The difficulties identified above bring to light the need to consider the
alternative route of providing a mechanism for states to encourage promo-
tion of social mobility in each other, similar to the approach discussed in
the previous section. Following this route would first necessitate overcom-
ing the notion that IHRL only applies between sovereigns and their sub-
jects, regulating the exercise of governmental authority.122 Beyond this
prism, the question of IHRL applicability is complex, gaining the attention
of much scholarship that focuses on its application in times of conflict123 or
extraterritorially.124
The terms and conditions for exterritorial application of IHRL are
complicated.125 For the purposes of this paper, the notion of extraterritorial-
ity is used to highlight that the international community does not rule out
the idea that states can have some overall obligation, even if states can
derogate from it, to promote IHRL values beyond their borders.126 Global
promotion of social mobility in the IHRL context can also be associated
with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), if for example we can link social
pliance rate. Machiko Kanetake, UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies Before Domestic
Courts, 67 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 201, 206–07 (2018).
119. On the other hand, the use of such independent experts is considered an important feature
of the IHRL monitoring process aimed at guaranteeing promotion of human rights and freedoms.
Navi Pillay, The International Human Rights Treaty System: Impact at the Domestic and Interna-
tional Levels, 21 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2014).
120. Westoff et al., supra note 5.
121. Establishing a new international human right, or recognizing it, can be very challenging,
even in cases where there is arguably global consensus. In the context of the right to a clean and
healthy environment, see the call by the HRC Special Rapporteur for the UN and the HRC to
adopt a decision to this effect. Hum. Rts. Council, Right to a Healthy Environment: Good Prac-
tices, ¶ 115, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/53 (Dec. 30, 2019).
122. Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in
the Occupied Territories, 37 ISR. L. REV. 17, 32 (2003).
123. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Parallel Applicability of International Humanitarian Law
and International Human Rights Law: Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Opera-
tion of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum,
40 ISR. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 592 (2007).
124. The significant question is what the standard for such extraterritorial application is. See
Yuval Shany, Transnational Armed Conflict: The Law Applicable to Non-Occupied Gaza: A Com-
ment on Bassiouni v. The Prime Minister of Israel, 42 ISR. L. REV. (SYMP. ISSUE) 101, 113 (2009).
125. See, e.g., Ralph Wilde, The Extraterritorial Application of International Human Rights
Law on Civil and Political Rights, in Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights 635
(2013).
126. See id. at 658.
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mobility with human security (an idea which can be developed with further
study).127
Ruling out the utility of using current IHRL monitoring mechanisms to
mandate, or encourage, states to promote social mobility (and suggesting
the application of a global and “exterritorial” notion of IHRL application), a
potential direction to explore is an IHRL social mobility right linked to the
Sustainable Development Goals 2030 (SDG). The SDGs include a set of
seventeen detailed goals (including 167 specific aims) for the international
community to achieve by the year 2030 and were adopted by 170 world
leaders in 2015.128 These goals relate to a variety of issues which are
“grounded” in IHRL and have been characterized as offering “critical op-
portunities to further advance the realization of human rights for all people
everywhere, without discrimination.”129
Taking a broad view of social mobility can probably link each one of
the SDGs to the concept of social mobility (or inherent inequality which
can be considered as a subset of social mobility) as all have to do with
promoting global and individual welfare in many relevant societal
spheres.130 At the same time, the SDGs also include SDG 10 titled “reduc-
ing inequality within and among countries.”131 Even if we stick to tradi-
tional notions of the concept, equality within countries cannot be achieved
without intergenerational mobility.132
From a legal perspective, the SDGs are embodied in a UN General
Assembly (GA) resolution.133 This can provide some formalization to the
commitments of the international community to realization of the goals, as
GA resolutions have some role to play in identification of international
law,134 and customary international law.135 Nevertheless, GA resolutions
127. For an example of this idea in the context of human security and R2P obligations, see
HANNES PELTONEN, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GRAVE HUMANITARIAN CRISES: COL-
LECTIVE PROVISION FOR HUMAN SECURITY 73 (2013).
128. G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment (Sept. 25, 2015).
129. Sustainable Development Goals: Human Rights and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/SDGS/pages/the2030agenda.aspx (last
visited July 17, 2020).
130. For an extensive discussion of the linkages between inequalities and the SDG 2030, see
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm’n. for Asia & the Pac., A Guide to Inequality and the SDGs, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESCAP/2842 (2019).
131. Goals: 10: Reduce Inequality Within and Among Countries, U.N. DIV. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV. GOALS, https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal10 (last visited July 17, 2020).
132. This is because inequality can set up a significant barrier to intergenerational mobility.
See Miles Corak, Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility, 27
J. ECON. PERSP. 79, 97–98 (2013).
133. See, e.g., G.A. Res 70/1, supra note 128.
134. For other aspects of the interaction between international law and the SDGs, see Dario
Piselli, The Sustainable Development Goals and International Law, SENSE & SENSIBILITY (Apr. 8,
2016), https://www.senseandsustainability.net/2016/04/08/the-sustainable-development-goals-
and-international-law.
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are not legally binding.136 Because the SDG 10 is not binding, using IHRL
to support SDG 10 can be useful in the transnational discourse on global
social mobility and in its domestic manifestations. From a practical perspec-
tive, the combination of IHRL and SDG-related social mobility is relevant
in designing development assistance and foreign aid. Basing development
assistance on compliance with IHRL is nothing new, and states who pro-
vide such assistance to the developing world can utilize the proposed link-
ages between IHRL and SDG to create incentives for social mobility
policies.137
Following this approach will echo the sentiment offered by the previ-
ous section regarding indicators which can “signal” to the international
community that a certain state is promoting social mobility. It can also sig-
nal that improvements in social mobility should be rewarded either by re-
ceiving increased development assistance or by removal of trade barriers.
Utilizing IHRL norms to promote social mobility across the globe
might likely be quite challenging as compliance with IHRL is still signifi-
cantly lacking.138 It is also the case that creating a new “right to social
mobility” might not garner support,139 although this does not preclude fur-
ther consideration and study of this possible route in the context of a
broader discussion of the outreach of IHRL and its limitations.140
These conclusions notwithstanding, there is merit and potential in
placing social mobility high on the agenda of IHRL implementation, en-
hanced by the SDGs in general and SDG 10 in particular. States adopting
this approach in bilateral and multilateral settings can both contribute and
benefit from framing social mobility as an IHRL issue to enhance domestic
and global equality.
135. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary International
Law, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 147, Conclusion 12, Comment 2 (2018).
136. This represents the common view, although in the past there were calls for a different
interpretation of General Assembly resolutions under some circumstances. See Oscar M. Gari-
baldi, The Legal Status of General Assembly Resolutions: Some Conceptual Observations, 73
PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.) 324, 324–27 (1979).
137. The linkage between the pursuit of human rights and economic objectives by the recipi-
ent state and providing aid is defined as “conditionality.” See HILDE SELBERVIK, AID AND CONDI-
TIONALITY: THE ROLE OF THE BILATERAL DONOR: A CASE STUDY OF NORWEGIAN-TANZANIAN
AID RELATIONSHIP 13 (1999).
138. Ingrid Weurth, Does International Law Have a “Broken Windows” Problem?, LAWFARE
(Apr. 10, 2017, 8:26 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-international-law-have-broken-win
dows-problem.
139. Such objections might be associated with the general criticism against the usefulness of
IHRL in the larger context. See Eric Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN
(Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights.
140. Such an approach could be associated with the view that a right of social mobility is
essential to ensure social inclusion. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, LEAVING NO ONE
BEHIND—THE IMPERATIVE OF INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON THE WORLD SOCIAL SITUA-
TION 2016, at 84, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/362, U.N. Sales No. E.16.IV.1 (2016).
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VI. CHALLENGES FOR POLICY MAKERS AND DIRECTIONS FOR A WAY
FORWARD
Analysis presented in the previous sections demonstrated the signifi-
cant potential for bilateral and transnational norms to promote social mobil-
ity. As suggested, these norms can provide important vehicles for
transforming the way social mobility is considered and regulated on a
global scale.
From a theoretical perspective, these suggested routes of utilizing in-
ternational economic law bilateral or multilateral frameworks or IHRL
norms (based on global justice and cosmopolitan values) provide a platform
for state actors to consider by placing social mobility high on the agenda
while conducting international relations. In the age of globalization, such a
shift in thinking might not be self-evident, but if social mobility is indeed a
cosmopolitan value as previously discussed, it should overcome any barri-
ers related to sovereignty. Persuasive as this line of argument may seem,
there are several key challenges for policy makers wishing to adopt the
suggested approach.
First, and foremost, in recent years, globalization previously accepted
as par for the course by the international community is facing significant
challenges in the form of a turn back to traditional sovereignty notions. This
is evident by historical events such as Brexit and policies enacted by states,
like the US in the past, which signify a boomerang reaction to globalization
and implementation of inward policies including transnational norms on
trade and climate.141 The inward turn can pose extremely complicated ob-
stacles, as discourse on trade is today sometimes portrayed as a competition
between states,142 and not as a means to promote global prosperity as was
the case in the past,143 or as ensuring global equality.144
141. These events can be considered as part of a wider anti-globalization trend with significant
implications. In the context of global health, see Isabelle Macgregor-Bowles & Devin C. Bowles,
Trump, Brexit, Right-wing Anti-globalisation, and an Uncertain Future for Public Health, 4
AIMS PUB. HEALTH 139, 139–48 (2017). This might change under the new U.S. administration,
but it is hard to tell whether the actions undertaken by the previous administration will have a
lingering impact.
142. For an argument that this framing is a matter of myth and that the true competition is
between states, see Yuwa Hedrick-Wong, Competition in International Trade: Separating Fact
from Fiction, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/yuwahedrickwong/2018/10/
18/competition-in-international-trade-separating-fact-from-fiction.
143. In this context, organizations like the U.N. called for states to avoid imposing trade re-
strictions that do not correspond with trade multilateralism. See, for example, in the context of
COVID-19-related trade restrictions, Kingsley Jeremiah, UN Warns Against Lopsided Trade
Rules, Climate Change, Others, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2020, 4:13 AM), https://guardian.ng/business
-services/un-warns-against-lopsided-trade-rules-climate-change-others.
144. See Press Release, U.N. Deputy Secretary-General, Multilateralism Key to Global Pros-
perity, Sustainability, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Symposium, Warning Trade Restrictions
Could Erode Confidence, Derail Growth, U.N. Press Release DSG/SM/1171-DEV/3327-ECO/282
(Apr. 27, 2018).
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This is a very difficult challenge for policy makers aiming for a global
framework for promoting social mobility on a global scale. One way to
mitigate this difficulty is to present a narrative of social mobility that is
disconnected from the trade discourse.145 In creating international norms,
domestic narrative can play an important role.146 Policy makers should
identify the publicly sensitive issues that can arise in order to neutralize
them and minimize objections to establishing the transnational normative
frameworks. Alternatively, policy makers can present bilateral and multilat-
eral norms supporting social mobility as geared towards benefiting all state
actors involved. This could be done, for example, by highlighting the fact
that if social mobility is increased in one country this could result in less
migration to the other—a hot button issue of concern for developed coun-
tries across the world.147
Second, scholars and policymakers engaging in work on social mobil-
ity usually narrowly perceive it as related to domestic circumstances and
policies.148 Accordingly, when studies and policies are developed these
heavily focus on domestic agendas and data.149 International perspectives,
if any, are considered as a part of a comparative analysis, reinforcing the
notion that social mobility is a domestic issue.150
This narrow perception can also be addressed by a change in narra-
tive151 using globalization-based transnational networks.152 Such networks,
whether composed of policy makers or scholars and technical experts, can
145. For an analysis pointing out the mixed results of international trade for global equality,
see Shujiro Urata & Dionisius A. Narjoko, Asian Dev. Bank Inst. [ADBI], International Trade
and Inequality, at 1, 18–19 (ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 675, Feb. 2017), https://
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/230591/adbi-wp675.pdf.
146. For the potential of transforming narratives for enhancing upward social mobility, see AI-
JEN POO & ELDAR SHAFIR, U.S. P’SHIP ON MOBILITY FROM POVERTY, CHANGING THE NARRATIVE
1, 12 (2018).
147. This concern is especially associated with lower-income individuals that can arguably be
exposed to economic harm, and reduced social mobility, resulting from immigration. For an ex-
ample with respect to Norway, see MARIA F. HOEN ET AL., RAGNAR FRISCH CTR. FOR ECON.
RSCH., IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY 41 (2019), https://www.frisch.uio.no/publikasjoner/
pdf/2019/immigration_and_social_mobility_revised_version.pdf.
148. In the U.S. context, see, for example, Xi Songa et al., Long-term Decline in Intergenera-
tional Mobility in the United States Since the 1850s, 117 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Scis. U.S. Am. 251,
251–58 (2020).
149. See, e.g., Kate Hopkins & Bernard Baker, Social Mobility: The Potential of a Genealogi-
cal Approach, 45 BRIT. EDUC. RSCH. J. 238, 249–50 (2019) (providing policy recommendations
derived from interviews with forty-two students enrolled in one school in the U.K.).
150. For one such study, see OECD, A Family Affair: Intergenerational Social Mobility
Across OECD Countries, in ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS GOING FOR GROWTH 183–200 (2010).
151. Contemporary studies of social mobility sometimes address transnationalism, but these
studies are mostly concerned with the study of social mobility in the context of transnational
families and immigration, rather than with the impacts of transnational trade or IHRL on social
mobility. See, e.g., KAROLINA BARGLOWSKI, THE SYMBOLIC MEANING OF MOBILITY IN TRANSNA-
TIONAL FAMILIES (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main, Institut für Soziologie,Working Paper
Series “Gender, Diversity and Migration” No. 7, 2015), https://www.fb03.uni-frankfurt.de/
58343458/Working_Paper_7.pdf.
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play an essential role in creating transnational norms to address global chal-
lenges.153 The elevation of domestic issues to a transnational level has often
benefited from such networks, including, inter alia, with regard to regula-
tion of international commerce (United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL)),154 and corruption.155 Creating
transnational networks to support social mobility also bodes well with the
globalization-inspired concept of a disaggregated state, where state and
non-state actors of a varied nature take leading roles in the design of trans-
national norms with counterparts from other states.
Third, transform the inherent perception that globalization, related to
trade or transnational norms, is an anathema to social mobility. This kind of
perception is often based on scholarship and studies or economic data156
and can constitute almost a deathblow to any efforts to internationalize so-
cial mobility values. This ingrained traditionally held view can be detrimen-
tal to any attempt to shift the normative placement of social mobility from
the domestic to the global, even if narratives change and supporting trans-
national networks are established. Out of the challenges presented herein,
this might be the most formidable and likely to pose the most difficult hur-
dle to overcome. Based on past experiences, an efficient and constructive
way to transform this notion is to build upon the wide definition of social
mobility, offered in the paper’s first section, and to promote buy in by lead-
ing international organizations.157 In January 2020, the World Economic
Forum (WEF), taking a global lead on the issue, created the social mobility
index, articulating an index ranking-based system158 that echoes the dis-
152. See Laura Oso & Laura Suárez-Grimalt, Migration and Intergenerational Strategies for
Social Mobility: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges, 42 MIGRACIONES 19, 19–41 (2017).
153. In the context of the review mechanism of the UNCAC, see, for example, Matti Joutsen
& Adam Graycar, When Experts Meet Diplomats, 18 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 425 (2012).
154. See About UNCITRAL, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/
about (last visited July 18, 2020).
155. See, e.g., Implementation Review Group, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/IRG/implementation-review-group.html (last visited May 1,
2021). The Implementation Review Group is a network of officials from UNCAC member states
(over 185 in number) responsible for any issues relating to UNCAC implementation.
156. The common argument seems to be that “[g]lobalization . . . [has] exacerbated inequali-
ties.” Parnjal Sharma, Davos 2020: Poor Social Mobility and Inequality Recognised as a Crisis,
BUS. STANDARD (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/davos-
2020-poor-social-mobility-and-inequality-recognised-as-a-crisis-120012101477_1.html.
157. This shift could occur if international organizations would consider the issue of social
mobility from a transnational perspective. In that context, one example is the focus of the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration (IOM) on the impacts of income derived by immigrants working
abroad to social mobility in source countries such as the Philippines, which coincided with the
agenda of the government to utilize migrant work for domestic advantages. See Jorge V. Tigno,
“Home Improvement?” Migration, Social Mobility, and Development in the Philippines, in SO-
CIAL MOBILITY: EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS FROM ASIA 89, 90 (Taejong Kim & Anthea Mulakala
eds., 2014).
158. Global Social Mobility Index 2020: Why Economies Benefit from Fixing Inequality,
WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 19, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-social-mobility-index-
2020-why-economies-benefit-from-fixing-inequality.
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course on raking presented earlier in this paper. While it is difficult to accu-
rately foresee the impact of this index, its message is clear that social
mobility is a key factor in creating prosperous societies and economic
growth.159
Noting that in some instances domestic change is triggered by creating
international norms and corresponding incentives, policy makers and schol-
ars alike, should utilize international platforms, as offered by the example
of the WEF,160 to change domestic policy making and highlight the global
focus on social mobility. Such a global focus, based on the practice of inter-
national organizations can support a shift from viewing social mobility as
purely domestic to approaching it as inherently linked to global norms and
in a positive rather than a negative stance.
Finally, if international organizations, driven by domestic stakehold-
ers, whether policy makers, private sector actors, scholars, or civil society,
will place social mobility as a high priority issue, subject to indexing and
standardization, this might result in the utilization of indices for the purpose
of making direct foreign investment decisions and policies.161 If this be-
came the case, the resulting benefits might constitute an important trade-off
with the drawbacks associated with deploying transnational incentives for
promoting social mobility.
Despite the viability of the solutions offered in this section, the chal-
lenges posed can be too difficult to overcome, at least for some states and
some state actors. Nevertheless, considering the potential domestic and
global benefits, including for the increase in trade and the potential for new
thinking and innovative approaches for promoting social mobility, there
could be great value for any stakeholder interested in social mobility,
globalization, or trade to engage on social mobility from the international,
rather than the solely domestic realm.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper offers two main routes to ensure that the “Jeffersons” of the
world are provided an equal opportunity to “move on up to the east side,”
and to increase social mobility on the global scale despite inherent tensions
with globalized trade frameworks. One route focuses on bilateral and multi-
lateral normative international economic law based frameworks, and an-
other focuses on IHRL combined with the SDGs.
As this paper’s final section highlighted, stakeholders wishing to pur-
sue either route might face inherent hurdles. Notwithstanding the solutions
159. See Karen Gilchrist, Where You’re Born Determines the Opportunities You Get in Life,
Says the World Economic Forum, CNBC (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/21/wef-
where-youre-born-determines-the-opportunities-you-get-in-life.html.
160. See Global Social Mobility Index 2020, supra note 158.
161. See SELBERVIK, supra note 137.
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proposed by the paper, such hurdles can be detrimental to any attempt to
“internationalize” any discourse of social mobility. Recognizing this diffi-
culty, even if analysis offered only results in persuading stakeholders of the
importance and potential of an international framing of social mobility, the
paper’s goal would have been achieved. This is because it would unearth a
so far mostly very narrowly debated positive linkage between globalization,
trade, and social mobility that can facilitate enhanced equality amongst and
within states, as envisioned in SDG 10, particularly necessary in light of the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global inequality.162
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